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Abstract.  Purpose.  Information science has been conceptualized as a partly unreflexive 
response to developments in information and computer technology, and, most powerfully, as 
part of the gestalt of the computer.  The computer was viewed as an historical accident in the 
original formulation of the gestalt.  An alternative, and timely, approach to understanding, and 
then dissolving, the gestalt would be to address the motivating technology directly, fully 
recognizing it as a radical human construction. 
 
Methodology / Approach.  The paper adopts a social epistemological perspective and is 
concerned with collective, rather than primarily individual, ways of knowing. 
 
Findings.  Information technology tends to be received as objectively given, autonomously 
developing, and causing but not itself caused, by the language of discussions in information 
science.  It has also been characterized as artificial, in the sense of unnatural, and sometimes as 
threatening.  Attitudes to technology are implied, rather than explicit, and can appear weak 
when articulated, corresponding to collective repression.   
 
Research implications.  Receiving technology as objectively given has an analogy with the 
Platonist view of mathematical propositions as discovered, in its exclusion of human activity, 
opening up the possibility of a comparable critique which insists on human agency. 
 
Originality / value of paper.  Apprehensions of information technology have been raised to 
consciousness, exposing their limitations.   
 
Keywords  Technology Computer gestalt  Social epistemology 
Categorisation Research paper 
 
Introduction 
 
A thesis derived from Marx – ‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence which determines their 
consciousness’ (Marx, 1975, p.425) – can strongly explain the production of information 
science, as part of collective consciousness.  The thesis has diffused and become accepted 
well beyond explicitly Marxian thought (Hobsbawm, 1998, pp.xi, 195).  A partial 
analogy can be detected with Kuhn’s insistence on instrumentation strongly affecting the 
development of scientific theory (Kuhn, 1970, pp.40-41), with instrumentation 
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corresponding to an aspect, although not the totality of, material being and scientific 
theory to the relevant form of consciousness.  From a perspective combining themes from 
Marx and Kuhn, information science has been conceptualized as part of a pattern where 
‘[n]ew tools beget new sciences’, specifically, as ‘a response to changing economic 
conditions, and most plausibly as a function of developments in computer technology’ 
(Brown, 1987, p.115).   
 
Such an account of the production of information science admits a strong influence from 
technology, as instrumentation, on consciousness, but need not be received as 
technologically determinist.  Technology can itself be understood as a human 
construction 1 and as ‘a part, a moment, naturally of great importance, of the social 
productive forces, but … neither simply identical with them, nor … the final or absolute 
moment of the changes in these forces’ (Lukács, 1973, p.53).  Technology can also be 
accorded a crucial role mediating between being, the conditions and activities necessary 
for the reproduction of human life, and consciousness: 
 
Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, the direct process of 
the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the process of the 
production of the social relations of his life, and of the mental conceptions that 
flow from these relations. 
 
(Marx, 1976, p.493) 
 
The relation between being, ‘the process of the production of the social relations of his 
life’, and consciousness, ‘the mental conceptions that flow from these relations’, can, on 
the basis given, be read in a particularly revealing way by studying technology and its 
effects on consciousness.  Mental conceptions can be regarded as underdetermined by 
being and technology (Childe, 1956, p.103) and by making the implicit effects of being 
and technology explicit, we may enlarge the freedom enabled by that underdetermination. 
 
The computer has been the defining technology for professional practice and for research 
in information science.  In information science practice, including the central domain of 
information retrieval, the computer as a universal information machine began to displace 
the special purpose information machines, which had proliferated from the late 19th 
century (Ohlman, 1996), from the 1950s.  Information science research has tended to 
receive significant software products from commercial developments.  It has also 
inherited a degree of mystical practice from computer science, with only indirect, and 
infrequent, access to the more restrained theory of computability (Leith, 1990, p.115).   
 
Information science has, then, tended to receive modern information technologies, 
particularly in their hardware aspect, as products, with less engagement with their 
processes of production.  The incomplete engagement with the production of technology 
may have led to a limited understanding of technology.  For instance, the significance of 
the computer for relieving the drudgery experienced in aspects of documentation work 
has been acknowledged (Meadows, 2002, p.172), but this has only recently been 
developed into a more systematic distinction of human mental labour from machine 
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processes (Warner, 2005, pp.554-563).  The congealed appearance of technology has 
been accepted without further investigation and its human origins and historical 
development (Ohlman, 1996) only occasionally explored.  Both the human construction 
of technology and the specific motivating historical forces for the growth of information 
science have, then, been disguised.  A compensating claim, often orally communicated 
rather than published, that information science distinctively deals with information 
processes apart from their technological manifestation, represses, rather than fully 
confronts, the influence from technology, by excluding technology from consideration.   
 
A more indirect influence from technology on information science has been from 
telecommunications.  The material technology was fully realised and widely diffused in 
the mid- to late 19th century – ‘the whole earth … [was] girded by telegraph cables’ 
(Marx, 1991, p.164).  An encompassing theory of telecommunications was not published 
until 1948, with Claude Shannon’s A mathematical theory of communication (Shannon, 
1993a), partly initiating a field often known as information theory.  Concepts and models 
of communication from information theory were deliberately imported into information 
science.  The process of importation often involved an analogical interpretation of those 
concepts and models (Tidline, 2004), applying them to the effects of messages on human 
consciousness or to the semantics of indexing, despite Shannon’s deliberate exclusion of 
issues of meaning from consideration (Shannon, 1993a, 1993b).  The diminished 
influence over time from information theory could be traced to the relative failure of 
attempts at its analogical application and to the declining number of information 
scientists from backgrounds in telecommunications (Roberts, 1976).  The influence from 
telecommunications on information science has, then, been from the material technology, 
through a particular form of consciousness, information theory, adapted to purposes 
excluded from its original formulation.  
 
The indirect influence from the technology of telecommunications can itself be 
understood as part of a pattern of adoption, by information science, of methods of thought 
favoured by disciplines associated with the production of technologies.  For instance, in 
information retrieval informing assumptions have been imported from physical and 
mechanical engineering, a deeper and more encompassing paradigm than those directly 
developed in information retrieval: 
 
the proto-paradigmatic base may then be seen as representing a deeper or 
more fundamental conceptual base for research following the Cranfield 
paradigm than could be offered by the procedures or results of the 
Cranfield tests themselves.  So that, rather than referring to it as the 
Cranfield paradigm it is perhaps more informative to conceive of it as the  
physical paradigm imported and given coherent form as a paradigm for 
information retrieval research by the Cranfield tests.  
 
(Ellis, 1992, p.52) 
 
The influence from the methods of thought associated with production of technologies is 
revealed, inter alia, in the experimental isolation of subjects for study and an immediate 
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resort to quantification.  Models for understanding and evaluating information retrieval 
systems have also been derived directly from information theory.  The broader influence 
from the mathematical and physical sciences has not always been as explicit as the 
analogical adoption of information theory but has been powerful and pervasive, with 
methods of thought functioning as grounding assumptions. 
 
Information science can, then, be understood as part of the gestalt of the computer, both 
through its motivation from modern information technologies and in the adoption and 
pervasive presence of scientific modes of thought.  The explicit formulation of the 
concept of the gestalt of the computer can be traced to 1974. 
 
The modern digital computer represents a high point in the development of 
deterministic electro-mechanical devices.  In many ways it also represents 
the high point, at least to date, of the scientific tradition just described.  In 
information science, as well as other disciplines the computer has become 
more than a tool or machine, it is a way a way of looking at the world.  The 
computer has emerged as a cultural phenomenon.  I call this the ‘gestalt of 
the computer’. 
 
(Rosenberg, 1974, p.264) 
 
Information science participated in the gestalt of the computer through its adoption of 
behaviourist psychology and a Newtonian view of man as a logically rational individual 
(Rosenberg, 1974, pp.264-265).  The computer itself was regarded as ‘perhaps an 
historical accident’ which need not be received as a ‘scientific organizing principle’.  
Deeper understandings of information developments were to be obtained by reaching 
beyond the technology – ‘We must get out from behind the computer.’ (Rosenberg, 1974, 
p.268).   
 
The gestalt of the computer is an extraordinarily powerful, if not fully developed and 
seldom explicitly adopted 2 concept, comprehending developments well beyond 
information science.  Artificial intelligence was included in the original formulation and 
regarded as influencing information science (Rosenberg, 1974, p.265).  Similarly, 
cognitive science and aspects of linguistics, with their insistence that theories of the mind 
(Johnson-Laird, 1988), or, specifically, comprehension of utterances (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1986, pp.94-95), should be modelled in computational terms, could be 
assimilated.  Other disciplines participate in the gestalt through their anthropomorphic 
conception of the computer and their inheritance of a ‘Newtonian, or deterministic, 
scientific tradition’ (Rosenberg, 1974, p.265).  The conception of the gestalt of the 
computer is amenable to different to different interpretations and transformations.  Its 
richness and power may be connected with the possibility of further transformation, in a 
manner reminiscent of Kuhn’s paradigm (Kuhn, 1970), for which a constellation of 
meanings was discovered. 
 
The particular nature of the participation of information science in the gestalt of the 
computer demands careful clarification.  A comprehensive bibliometric mapping of 
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information science noted that it is ‘well-known that more than one disciplinary group 
uses the term ‘information science’ for its activities’ (White and McCain, 1998, p.328) 
and then delimited the discipline of concern: 
 
Our choice of journals operationalizes the field as … ‘library and information 
sciences’.  …  Broadly speaking, this field concerns itself with modeling the 
world of publications, with a practical goal of being able to deliver their 
content to inquirers on demand.  It is very much implicated with large, content-
bearing linguistic structures like indexes, catalogs, and assemblages of full text.   
 
(White and McCain, 1998, p.328) 
 
The operationalization of the field is acceptable as a characterization of its activities and 
is empirically supported by the congruence between the realistic initial restrictions and 
the convincing final results of the bibliometric study.  The other disciplinary groups using 
the term information science, which would occupy other journal literatures, are excluded 
as they ‘involve symbol manipulations that are relatively content-neutral; they are 
infrastructural to information science in our sense’ (White and McCain, 1998, p.328).   
 
An influence from technology is not admitted in the characterization of information 
science as ‘library and information sciences’.  However, a deliberately excluded broader 
conception of information science betrays conceptual congruences with the potential of 
the computer and even verbal analogies with characterizations of that potential. 
 
The rich word ‘information’ has seduced some into characterizations of their 
field that are, to date, overgeneral.  …  These definitions would have ASIS-
style information science dealing with employers’ payrolls, a housewife’s 
grocery receipts, Nightline, arrival and departure listings in airports, the Grand 
Ole Opry, and color-coded vial caps used by crack dealers.  Need we say that it 
does not? 
 
(White and McCain, 1998, p.353) 
 
The computer as a universal information machine would be used, and sometimes feature 
centrally, in all the excluded activities.  An early discussion of the computer as a 
universal machine is verbally reminiscent of the areas excluded: 
 
If it should turn out that the basic logics of a machine designed for the 
numerical solution of differential equations coincide with the logics of machine 
intended to make bills for a department store, I would regard this as the most 
amazing coincidence that I have ever encountered.  
 
(Howard Aiken quoted in Davis 1988, p.152) 
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The areas excluded from the characterization and operationalization of information 
science have adopted the technology of the computer, although this need not imply full 
participation in its gestalt. 
 
A broader conception of information science has been advocated and partly developed.  
For instance, broadly concurrent with the formulation of the gestalt of the computer, it 
was argued that  ‘prescriptive restrictions of the areas of investigation thought proper to 
information science’ (Roberts, 1976, p.249) should be disputed and that: 
 
The social implications of communication and information are such that only 
the widest social base is acceptable as an area of study for information science. 
 
(Roberts, 1976, p.251) 
 
At a later date and from a concern with the influence of technology on consciousness, it 
was urged that information science should ‘broaden its academic remit to include serious 
consideration of the ‘information society’ and how it interlocks with the total social 
situation’ (Brown, 1987, p.113).  More extensive conceptions of information science, 
both in social and historical scope, have since begun to develop within the journal and 
monographic literature of information science (Kari and Hartel, 2007).   
 
The operationalization of the field in terms of its literature by White and McCain (1998) 
could then be accepted, with an extension to its monographic literature, and, similarly, its 
characterization of the topics covered, with the qualification that information science is 
extending beyond these, still centrally included, topics.  Crucially, in relation to the 
gestalt of the computer, information science inherits, and partly sustains, concerns from 
librarianship and documentation, which then encounter with the growth of modern 
information and communication technologies and the gestalt of the computer itself, with 
the inheritance disguised, and sometimes distorted, by that gestalt.  The inheritance from 
librarianship and documentation can usefully be conceived as the diachronic or vertical 
axis intersecting with the synchronic or horizontal band of the technologies and their 
associated gestalt, with technologies developing and the gestalt modulating over time. 
 
The pattern of a diachronic inheritance intersecting with a synchronic band can function 
as a model for the relation of other disciplines to the computer and its gestalt.  For 
instance, computer science itself could be regarded as bringing an inheritance from 
mathematics and logic, analogous to the areas identified as ‘content-neutral’ by White 
and McCain (1998, p.328), to the technology, with the gestalt particularly revealed in 
associations between the computer and intelligence.  Cognitive science, connected to the 
gestalt by its insistence on the modelling of human thought as computational processes 
(Johnson-Laird, 1988; Sperber and Wilson, 1986), could be traced to behaviourist 
psychology.  Information systems, regarded as a cognate subject, but disjunct discipline 
from, information science (Ellis, Allen, and Wilson, 1999), inherits themes from business 
administration.  A concern with the gestalt of the computer, from within information 
science, then has relevance to other disciplines influenced by the technology and 
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participating in the gestalt.  It may also help further to situate information science in 
relation to synchronically contiguous disciplines. 
 
The gestalt of the computer is primarily understood as false consciousness, obstructing or 
preventing understanding, in the original critique.  Other disciplines, even those partly 
participating in the gestalt, have recognized analogous elements of false consciousness.  
For instance, from computer science, Dijkstra (1989, p.xxxv) observed that, the 
‘anthropomorphic metaphor – for whose introduction we can blame John von Neumann – 
is an enormous handicap for every computing community that has adopted it … [t]he 
analogy that underlies this personification is so shallow that it is not only misleading but 
also paralyzing.’.  In contrast to the original formulation, elements rather than an entirety 
of false consciousness are recognized and recognition is combined with a continuing 
engagement with the motivating technology.  A general limitation of the view of the 
gestalt as entirely false consciousness is that it disguises or obscures real changes 
occurring in the material basis of being, in technologies, and in behaviour and 
consciousness influenced by being mediated by technology.  A related specific, and 
crucial, weakness of the original critique is the dismissal of the computer as, ‘perhaps an 
historical accident’ (Rosenberg, 1974, p.268).  The dismissal could be considered 
analogous to the repression of technology identified in information science, revealing that 
the critique partly participates in the gestalt it identifies as false consciousness. 
 
The idea of the computer as an historical accident can also be severely questioned 
empirically.  Conceptualization of the computer may have been exogenous to the 
scholarly and public communities which subsequently received technologies as products, 
but can be situated in relation to symbolic and mathematical logic, with logic formalized 
in the mid-19th century, converging with mathematics in the early 20th, and with the 
theory of computation developed within mathematics in the mid-1930s (Herken, 1995).  
Invention occurred in possibly three partly non-communicating locations quasi-
simultaneously, in the United States, England, and, possibly, Germany, motivated by the 
need to transform intercepted ciphers into plain text messages (Davis, 2000, pp.177-197).  
Diffusion by adoption of the computer as an innovation or commercial product can be 
regarded as partly motivated by lower costs of technological processes compared to direct 
human mental labour (Webster, 1990; Warner, 2005) 3.  By 1967, it could be observed 
that, ‘[t]hough only some of us deal directly with computers, all of us are falling under 
the shadow of their ever-growing sphere of influence’ (Minsky, 1967, p.vii).  By 1999, 
diffusion had proceeded further, with many dealing directly with computers: as Time 
noted, ‘everyone who taps at a keyboard, opening a spreadsheet or a word-processing 
program, is working on an incarnation of a Turing machine’ (Time, 1999; Quoted in 
Davis, 2000, p.193).   
 
A late 20th century revolution in the mechanization of mental labour (Minsky, 1967, p.2), 
possibly now stabilizing, can be detected, with the special purpose information machines 
whose diffusion preceded the computer understood as the transitional forms preceding the 
punctuation of an equilibrium or as the accumulation of contradictions leading to a 
revolutionary change.  Understandings of computability have been experientially 
acquired by wider publics, from the use of technologies as products, and should be a 
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priori congruent with more esoteric theoretical conceptions of computability, which 
themselves appeal to what would naturally be regarded as computable (Minsky, 1967, 
pp.105-111).  Current contexts of use, particularly the wider public sphere, are radically 
different from the original content of conceptualization and invention, and from the 
continuing mathematical culture of computer science, with limited direct diffusion of 
central, and crucial, concepts of computability from logic, mathematics, and computer 
science to the public sphere. 
 
The diffusion and relative stabilization of the computer has eroded its gestalt, in the sense 
of a mysterious object held within relatively enclosed communities.  For instance within 
information systems, regarded as cognate subject with, but separate discipline from, 
information science (Ellis, Allen, and Wilson, 1999), information technology has been 
recognized as an infrastructural resource shared by competitors rather than a 
differentiating factor, potentially conferring competing advantage (Carr, 2004).  Such a 
recognition of the effects of the wide availability of a technology could have been, and 
was, anticipated from established economic understandings 4, but the wide diffusion of 
the insight is indicative of technological stabilization and a reduction of the sense of 
mystery.  Concurrently with Carr (2004), there were pleas within information systems for 
a return to a more literal and descriptive, rather than potentially mystical, terminology: 
‘So-called information technology … processes data, not information.  We should  ... 
revert to the original name used for information systems in the 1960s and 1970s: data 
processing systems’ (Galliers, 2004, p.252).  The erosion of the gestalt within 
information systems can be regarded as, in part, a product of the process of naturalization 
of technologies. 
 
The erosion of the gestalt is different from the articulation of a counter-position, which 
identifies real changes, and, in particular, naturalization may even inhibit the production 
of an articulated counter-position.  Naturalization can be understood as the transformation 
of the socially constructed into the natural, disguising its human origins (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966).  Naturalization of technologies may occur almost consequentially with 
their diffusion.  Naturalization can be distinguished from humanization, a possible 
counter-position, and may even be in tension with it.  Humanization would be understood 
as recognizing the technology as the product of human mental and productive labour over 
time, with the technology conceived, invented, and adopted under specific historical 
circumstances.  In contrast to the progressive development of naturalization, a deliberate, 
partly theoretical and possibly painful, effort is required for humanization.  Unless a 
counter-position, including the humanization of the motivating technology, is fully and 
deliberately articulated, the gestalt as false consciousness may disappear from the place in 
which it has been identified and reappear in another – consider , as an example of 
relocation, the transfer of research attention from artificial intelligence to data-mining. 
 
A particularly timely approach to understanding, and then dissolving, the gestalt of the 
computer would be to address the motivating technology directly, humanizing it, and not 
dismiss it as a historical accident.  The elements of false consciousness associated with 
the gestalt could be dissolved away to expose real transformations in being and more 
permanent, and legitimately grounded, changes in consciousness.  The possibility of 
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relevant concepts not open to computational modelling and the need to ‘get out from 
behind the computer’ (Rosenberg, 1974, p.268) are not denied, but the intention is to 
absorb the computer, and other modern information and communication technologies, 
within the perspective developed.  The gestalt can then be transcended, rather than partly 
reproduced by the repression, in effect, of the motivating technology in an otherwise 
powerful critique, only for the gestalt independently to continue and to transform and re-
emerge.  
 
The Janus-like character of information technology, familiarly regarded as facing both 
the technical world of bits and the social world of human communication, but also 
requiring understanding from formal and from discursive disciplines, must be fully 
confronted.  Heidegger’s remark that, the ‘essence of technology is by no means anything 
technological’ and that, accordingly, ‘essential reflection upon technology and decisive 
confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence 
of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it’ (Heidegger, 1993, 
pp.311 and 340) assumes a specific relevance here.  The material substances from which 
information technologies are constructed have changed over time, without affecting the 
possibilities and limits of computation, most fully formally understood by automata 
theory.  The divide between the disciplines involved in the conceptualization of the 
computer, of formal logic and mathematics, from the human and more discursive 
sciences, themselves more widely publicly intelligible, must be transcended. 
 
The immediate concern here will be with the symptoms of repression of the influence 
from technology on the development of information science.  The language of many 
discussions tends to treat technology as objectively given and as an autonomous 
development.  Receiving technology as an unmotivated and exogenously given 
development corresponds to naturalization, the transformation of the humanly created 
into the natural.  There can be traces of technological determinism, most subtly and 
pervasively in the absence of the recognition of technology as a human construction.  
Attitudes may be implied, rather than fully articulated, and their diffusion and strength 
could be related to their lack of formal articulation.  Implied attitudes may only be 
recognized when they are transgressed or identified.  While the false consciousness of the 
reification of technology is sustained, information science’s understanding of itself, and 
its potential for contribution to other disciplines, remains restricted. 
 
Dissolving the gestalt has a triple relevance, to information science’s understandings of 
itself, to enhancing the developing broader conception of information science, and to 
other disciplines implicated in the gestalt by analogous patterns of disciplinary 
inheritance and synchronic encounter.  The loss of clarity which might follow from the 
seductions of over generality (White and McCain, 1998, p.353) can be avoided by a 
rigorous focus on portions of specific texts known to information science. 
 
The focus will be on collective, rather than primarily individual, ways of knowing, in 
accord with a social epistemological approach (Shera, 1965), which has been more 
recently partially revived as a proposal for the sociology of texts (McKenzie, 1986, p.7).  
The choice of texts for study from information science is admittedly eclectic, but remains 
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sufficient, as counter- rather than further examples would be required to disprove the 
themes developed.  The wider public understanding of information, embodied in reports 
of information theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), itself widely diffused and influential 
but poorly understood (Tidline, 2004), will also be considered.  Individual 
consciousnesses can be understood to be included in the collective consciousness 
explored. 
 
Understandings of technology 
 
Objectively given 
 
Technology is often conceived as objectively given, with attitudes revealed by 
implication rather than explicitly stated, although there can be a continuum from the 
implicit to the explicit.  The following quotation implicitly embodies a view of 
technology as objectively given: 
 
We enter the epoch in the natural history of information technology – our 
epoch, our epic – epitomized and energized by the personal computer and its 
adjuncts. 
 
(Levinson, 1997, p.114) 
 
A view of technology as having causal effects is congruent with receiving technology as 
objectively given, although causality is partly explicitly conceived: for instance, within the 
same work, the position, ascribed to McLuhan, that copyright was a consequence of the 
printing press, is endorsed without exploring the possibility that both the diffusion of the 
printing press and the development of copyright were effects of Protestant individualism 
(Levinson, 1997, p.189).  Most explicitly, a ‘natural history of information technology’ is 
proposed (Levinson, 1997, p.114), with the reference to natural obscuring the human origins 
of technology.  In other studies, a causal connection from technology to society is similarly 
made: for instance, a democratic tendency is ascribed to modern communication and 
information technology, and a correlation between measures of democracy and 
interconnectivity observed, although with some, but not full, distinction between correlation 
and causality (Kedzie, 1997, pp.107-113).   
 
Even studies which acknowledge the social dimension of technology, by carefully 
addressing its social impacts, may partly reproduce the implied understanding of technology 
as objectively given, by failing to enquire into the forces prompting the adoption and 
diffusion of specific technologies.  For instance, contributors to the early study edited by 
Ithiel de Sola Pool, The social impact of the telephone (Sola Pool, 1977), acknowledge that, 
the ‘telephone is a device with subtle and manifold effects which cannot be well guessed a 
priori’, but still tend consistently to regard it as causing, or having impacts, but not itself 
caused, beyond the science and technology mediated by Bell as an inventor (Pierce, 1977, 
p.159; Gottman, 1977, p.309).  Similarly, H.G. Wells had earlier treated transport 
technologies as having extensive effects: 
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The growth of our great cities, the rapid populating of America, the entry of 
China into the field of European politics are, for example, quite obviously and 
directly consequences of new methods of locomotion. 
 
(Wells, 1902, p.3) 
 
The communication technology of the telephone had secondary effects: it ‘will almost 
certainly prove a very potent auxiliary indeed to the forces making for diffusion’ (Wells, 
1902, p.58).  A more sophisticated view, which does not deny impacts but which more fully 
addresses the production of the technology itself, would be to regard the rapid 
transformation of the telephone from invention to diffusion as driven by the need for 
business communication over distance. 
 
Premodern computational technologies have been similarly conceived as objectively given, 
particularly in their material aspects, with the resistance of physical substance to human 
manipulation understood as restraining the development of technologies.  A characteristic 
view of Babbage’s enterprise would be that: 
 
Babbage never succeeded in constructing his [analytical] engine, in large 
part because of the limitations of nineteenth century technology. 
 
(Davis, 1995, p.152) 
 
A more detailed account, contained in a biography of Babbage, partly reproduces the 
received view – ‘electrical technology was not sufficiently advanced for Babbage’s 
requirements … Babbage’s methods of the 1860s were technologically premature’ 
(Hyman, 1982, pp.172, 245-246) – but also gives evidence which can be used to question 
it.  Babbage’s Engines were predominantly individual enterprises with limited funding 
(Hyman, 1982, pp.172n, 231).  In contrast, the trans-Atlantic telegraph was collectively 
funded and developed and the substantial difficulties encountered in its construction were 
successfully resolved, by 1866.  A more satisfying explanation for the contrast between 
the arrest of Babbage’s Engines between conceptualisation and invention and the 
progress of the telegraph to diffusion would be that the social need for the rapid 
transmission of messages over space was greater than for automatic data-processing, in 
the mid- to late 19th century 5.  The accordingly greater investment in message 
transmission technologies was able to overcome the resistance of material substance.  In 
the received view, technology tends to be identified with its material aspects and 
implicitly conceived as exogenous to logic and mathematics, which may be more readily 
recognised as human constructions. 
 
Raising the implied view of technology as objectively given to consciousness and 
critiquing is not to deny that material substance may offer different, and, possibly, greater 
resistance to humanly imposed patterns than semiotic phenomena.  Rather it is to insist 
that such implicit conceptions of technology receive technology as a given and tend to 
deny that it is a product of human mental and physical labour, humanly made by working 
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on the accumulated knowledge embodied in existing technologies as well as on material 
substances. 
 
Autonomous development 
 
Technology is also received as an autonomous development, growing independently of 
human activity, but having causal effects on human behaviour.  For instance, in the view 
that, successive generations of online systems have led to changes in the relations 
between intermediaries and end-users (Hancock-Beaulieu, 1993, p.1), information 
technologies are implicitly conceived as independently developing and as having causal 
effects.  More explicitly, James Beniger’s influential study of the control revolution 
(Weller and Bawden, 2005) concludes, ‘technology appears autonomously to beget 
technology’ (Beniger, 1986, p.434).  Appears implies a reservation on receiving 
technology as an autonomous development, and the idea of the rapid development of 
technologies has real historical correspondences, but Beniger does not fully move beyond 
implying a possibly misleading appearance.  Beget is associated with biblical genealogies 
and implies the significance of technological development, but as a mysterious process, 
with evidently not self-reproducing objects characterised in terms of human reproduction.  
The idea of descent and transformation can be preserved, while distinguishing human 
activity from that of natural and inert materials.  Norbert Wiener observed: 
 
In all engineering, there is a certain family history, a certain genealogy.  The 
smith’s hammers were forged by the hammers of an earlier smith. 
 
(Wiener, 1993, pp.46-47). 
 
In contrast to Beniger, Wiener acknowledges that technology is humanly constructed, 
using existing instruments of labour, exposing the real empirical basis for its cumulative 
development. 
 
The idea of technology as an autonomous and causal force is present in wider scholarly 
discourse, beyond information science.  It can be detected, for instance, in the assertion 
that, ‘[t]here is surely no question about the impact of the printing press as a force for 
change’ (Jardine, 2004), without enquiring into the forces which made for the diffusion of 
printing.  Other texts can slide between implied elements of causality from technology to 
an explicit assertion that technology is not autonomous and out of control, but can be 
deliberately humanly modified (Levinson, 1997, pp.189, 204).  The idea of technology as 
out of control has been detected as a recurrent motif in understandings of productive 
technologies in political thought (Winner, 1997).   
 
A more sophisticated position is required, which recognizes the social changes associated 
with technologies and their appearance of autonomous development, but which attends to 
the causes as well as the impact of technology and which moves beyond implying that an 
appearance of self-reproduction is misleading. 
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Threatening and artificial 
 
A widely diffused and strongly influential image of industrial technology is as something 
threatening and artificial, with artificial implicitly primarily understood as unnatural 
rather than as made by human artifice.  Marvin Minsky alludes to the threat to the human 
body from industrial machine, in one of the few explicit discussions of the image of the 
machine within computer science, after differentiating information and control from 
industrial machines: 
 
It [the term machine] brings to mind a big, heavy, complicated object 
which is noisy, greasy, and metallic; performs jerky, repetitive, and 
monotonous motions; and has sharp edges that may hurt one if he does not 
maintain sufficient distance. 
 
(Minsky, 1967, p.1) 
 
The description of the machine is thematically and even verbally reminiscent of Dickens’ 
characterization of industrial machinery in Coketown in Hard Times, where ‘the piston of 
the steam-engine worked monotonously up and down, like the head of an elephant in a 
state of melancholy madness’ (Dickens, 1989, p.28).  The reference to ‘melancholy 
madness’ in the analogous passage brings out the implication by Minsky that 
monotonous, repetitive, and jerky movements would be regarded as signs of mental 
disturbance in human or animals, confirming the alien character of  the machine to 
normal human being. 
 
Further associated effects on human consciousness can be connected with the hard 
materiality of the machine.  The substantively real danger to the body from the machine 
may account for the reluctance to embrace it as a human product.   
 
Even today, most of the machinery we see is concerned with the use of brute 
power to distort and transform crude materials.  Most present-day machines are 
dangerous.  Unlike our bodies, production machines are made of large, sturdy 
parts that need no soft sheathing for their protection. 
 
(Minsky, 1967, p.1) 
 
These effects may be reduced, although not entirely eroded, for machinery approaching 
or constituting information technology: 
 
There are occasional exceptions to this feeling.  We may admire in the works 
of a small watch that craftsmanship required to create miniatures; we may 
admire the quiet competence of a high-speed computer.  Neither of these are 
involved in the distortion of materials; they are still machines, however, and 
not too far to be trusted. 
 
(Minsky, 1967, p.2) 
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The surface appearance of a clear boundary between the machine and its environment and 
from other machines, plausibly derived from its hard materiality of the machine, is liable 
to be betrayed when systematic attempts at delimitation are made. 
  
the question of where a particular machine ends and its environment begins can 
only be settled by a convention or definition.  The body can be regarded as the 
environment for the brain or for the liver.  The distinction between the essential 
part of a machine and the inessential trim depends on one’s choice of values.  
 
(Minsky, 1967, p.19) 
 
The difficulty of demarcation is reminiscent of Saussure’s remark that, in linguistics, ‘it is 
the viewpoint adopted which creates the object’ (Saussure, 1983, p.8) 
 
The distinction implied in the contrast between machinery which distorts materials and 
those quietly working without distorting their environment can be developed into a 
theoretically articulated understanding of information technology: 
 
[information technologies] do not do ‘work’ as did machines of the Industrial 
Revolution.  Instead of dealing with material or energy, we are told they handle 
‘control’ and ‘information’ and even ‘intellectual processes’ 
 
(Minsky, 1967, p.vii) 
 
Concepts developed for machines for the transmission of force do not fully comprehend 
information technology or information mechanisms within such technologies: 
 
the classical idea of ‘simple machine’ – lever, wheel, inclined plane, etc. – does 
not capture the spirit of what is involved in today’s machines because it doesn’t 
help understand anything except the transmission of force.  We cannot explain 
in those terms even some parts of clockwork, such as the ratchet (an 
information-storage device) 
 
(Minsky, 1967, p.7n) 
 
The idea that information technology is concerned with information and control would be 
a grounding assumption for computer science.  An analogue has developed in ordinary 
discourse, where it would be informally understood that information technologies act on 
information or data and are not directly concerned with the transmission of force or the 
distortion of materials 6.  The substances from which computers are made have reduced 
their machine character since Minsky’s observations.  It may now require a deliberate 
effort to recall that the computer is only a machine, of a specific type, with the effort 
needed to sustain this position testifying to the distorting power and wide diffusion of the 
gestalt. 
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Issues analogous to those arising for industrial machinery can be detected for information 
technologies and may have arisen as transformed inheritances or independently 
developed commonalities.  The appearance of a clear boundary around an information 
machine, which might be given by its character as a physical object, is similarly 
continually betrayed for information technologies, including the computer.  Information 
and communication technologies, such as the radio, camera, telephone, and satellite, need 
to be embedded in an elaborate infrastructure to make them useful and to preserve their 
usefulness (Ohlman, 1996, p.694).  The difficulty of demarcating a computer from linked 
storage devices then complicates the correlation with models of the computational 
process.  The original models did not differentiate volatile from persistent media (the 
distinction was also not present in early magnetic core based machines) (Cockshott and 
Michaelson, 2007, p.239).  The distinction of program from data, discernible clearly from 
the models, can also become arbitrary in working practice.  The difficulty of determining 
where a particular machine begins and ends, present for industrial machinery, applies, 
then, to information technologies as well. 
 
Information technology is also similarly perceived as threatening and artificial, with the 
strength of the feeling and the depth of the analogy suggesting that it is both a 
transformed inheritance and independently sustained commonality.   The danger to the 
human body associated with industrial machinery is replaced by supplanting or 
destroying of the human mind.  Poincaré, in advance of the construction of working 
computers, but critiquing the reduction of mathematics to purely formal procedures, 
which preceded and enabled the isolation of mathematical operations for automata 
theory, suggested: 
 
Thus it will be readily understood that, in order to demonstrate a theorem, it is 
not necessary or even useful to know what it means.  We might replace 
geometry by the reasoning piano imagined by Stanley Jevons; or, if we prefer, 
we might imagine a machine where we should put in axioms at one end and 
take out theorems at the other, like that legendary machine in Chicago where 
pigs go in alive and come out transformed into hams and sausages.  It is no 
more necessary for the mathematician than it is for these machines to know 
what he is doing. 
 
(Poincaré, 1952, p.147)  
 
The analogy between mechanical computational processes and the destruction and 
transformation of the animal body embodies the link between the threat from industrial 
machinery and from information technology and is extraordinarily intensely expressed.  
The formal character of then new mathematics, critiqued by Poincaré but inherited by 
computer science, has tended to remain dominant.  The substantive could be isolated 
from the mythic components of the threat, by acknowledging technology as a human 
construction, which may reconfront its producers in the appearance of objective reality (a 
chess playing computer which defeats a human grandmaster remains a product of human 
activity, in both its hardware and software aspects).  In the case of information 
technology, the further possibility of human intelligence exceeding the computational 
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procedures it can produce can also be indicated (consider the human construction of this 
sentence). 
 
Mythic accounts of technology similarly regard it as both humanly made and non-human 
and as threatening its creator, with some confusion between maker and monster.  In the 
modern myth of Frankenstein, creating the monster technology is analogous to 
conception, parturition, and birth: 
 
With an anxiety that almost amounted to agony, I collected the 
instruments of life around me that I might infuse a spark of being into the 
lifeless thing that lay at my feet.  It was already one in the morning; the 
rain pattered dismally against the panes, and my candle was nearly burnt 
out, when, by the glimmer of the half-extinguished light, I saw the dull 
yellow eye of the creature open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion 
agitated its limbs.  
 
(Shelley, 1998, pp.38-39) 
 
The monster is made from dead human parts, brought to life by intervention from a living 
human, but rejected by the people it encounters, with pathos attaching to it as a victim of 
human conduct, both in the original narrative and filmic representations.  The popular 
confusion of maker and monster corresponds to the absence of a clear boundary between 
machine and environment.  The human maker exists towards his monster, which has some 
analogies with the golem, formed from clay, of Jewish mythology (Wiener, 1966, p.95), as 
God to man.  Frankenstein’s monster, like Satan, is exiled.  There is a reluctance to embrace 
what man has made.  The Frankenstein myth embodies the humanist perspective on 
technology, now eroding in relation to information technology, in which technology is 
received as unnatural and not human, rather than, more fully, humanly made but not human 
in itself, with both the restricted and encompassing perspective captured by the myth. 
 
Information theory and information technology 
 
The wider public understanding of information, as a nexus of associations between 
information and modern technologies, may have been influenced by the diffusion of 
information theory, possibly to the extent of the adoption of the term, information 
technology.  Public discussions of information theory tend to share the characteristics of 
other discourse about information technology. 
 
Obituaries of Claude Shannon revealed a view of technology as an autonomous 
development, in its material aspect. 
 
Many of Shannon’s pioneering insights were developed before they could 
be applied in practical form.  Along with Alec Reeves’s concept of 
telephone conversations transmitted as pulses and Alan Turing’s dream of  
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all-purpose computing devices, Shannon’s ideas had to wait for solid-state 
electronics to mature before they could be achieved practically. 
 
(Emerson, 2001). 
 
The references to to wait and to to mature imply growth independent of human activity.  
The continuation from the obituary, ‘it was only the arrival of integrated circuits in the 
1970s that made possible the commercial exploitation of technology based on Shannon’s 
theories’ (Emerson, 2001), treats technology as objectively given in its reference to 
arrival.   It also indicates the concurrent, although not necessarily simply causally 
connected, development of integrated circuits and of the practical application of 
Shannon’s theories, regarded by Shannon as sharing the non-constructive nature of 
existence proofs, in certain respects (Shannon, 1993, p.39) 7.  Theories are treated as 
specific human constructions, associated with, and sometimes called after, the names of 
their inventors, while the material aspects of technology are conceived as natural and 
external to human activity 
 
The full historical precedence of theory to practice is questionable, from a more inclusive 
understanding of practice: the 19th century telegraph embodied the components of the 
model of communication formulated by Shannon, with human and technological entities 
corresponding to the information source, message, transmitter, signal, communication 
channel, receiver, and destination; the telegraphic codes Shannon played with as an 
adolescent were subsequently found to be highly efficient in their reduction of 
redundancy from alphabetic written messages for telegraphic signals, when assessed from 
information theory.  Turing’s universal machine was also constructed before solid state 
electronics.  A fuller understanding of the dynamics of development of technology is 
needed, which acknowledges a dialectic interchange between practice and theory, with 
contrasting constraints on theoretical development and practical implementation. 
 
Languages of discussion 
 
Languages of discussion have been regarded as significant in the discussion here, 
implicitly understanding consciousness as constituted in language (Vološinov, 1986, 
pp.85-93).  The idea of technology in its material aspect as objectively given, 
autonomous, simultaneously human and non-human, and threatening may reflect an 
inheritance from the development of language itself.  Languages developed at an early 
stage of social development where there was little distinction made between inanimate 
things and persons: things have gender in two-gendered languages, ‘a knife cuts and a 
flint flakes’ (Childe, 1956, pp.84, 86-89, 117), and brooks have mouths (Fisch and 
Bergin, 1990, pp.91-92).  In the myths inherited from the society of the Old Stone Age, 
things were composed of substances, with the idea of substance generated from the 
manual fabrication of tools and profoundly affecting man’s reproduction of reality 
(Childe, 1956, p.89).  Similarly, the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico, noted that 
language embodies a view of nature as animated and human. 
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Thus head for top or beginning; the brow and shoulders of a hill; the eyes of 
needles and of potatoes; mouth for any opening; the lip of a cup or pitcher; the 
teeth of a rake, a saw, a comb; the beard of wheat; the tongue of a shoe; the 
gorge of a river; a neck of land; an arm of the sea; the hands of a clock; heart 
for center (the Latins used umbilicus, navel, in this sense); the belly of a sail; 
foot for end or bottom; the flesh of fruits; a vein of rock or mineral; the blood 
of grapes for wine; the bowels of the earth.  Heaven or the sea smiles; the wind 
whistles; the waves murmur; a body groans under a great weight. The farmers 
of Latium used to say the fields were thirsty, bore fruit, were swollen with 
grain; and our rustics speak of plants making love, vines going mad, resinous 
trees weeping.  Innumerable other examples could be collected from all 
languages. 
 
(Vico, 1976, p.129 (§405))  
 
The threat to the human body from the material aspects of technologies particularly 
incorporates the primitive conception of substance as both human and non-human and as 
resistant to humanly imposed patterns.  The attitudes to technology discovered are, then 
constituted in language, with language itself permeated by primitive animist assumptions, 
but are not solely linguistic and have analogues in disciplinary and conceptual divides, 
particularly between the humanist resistance to technology as non-human and the 
scientific and technological fascination with the artificial. 
 
Analogy with Platonism 
 
The idea of technology as objectively given also has an analogy with the Platonist view 
of mathematical propositions as discovered rather than created, particularly in its elision 
of human activity.  Further analogies can be found between the idea of technology as 
objectively given and other, less specific and more widely culturally diffused, elements of 
Platonism, particularly the view of ideas or ideal forms existing independently of human 
activity and apart from particular instantiation in an expression.  The analogy between 
receiving technology as objectively given and Platonist perspectives on mathematical 
propositions and on ideas and their expression may be largely implicit, but can still be 
highly influential, with its power partly deriving from the lack of explicit articulation. 
 
Platonism may have been a partly unconscious inheritance from the mathematically 
influenced contexts from which information science developed (Roberts, 1976) and there 
is also the possibility of explicit derivation.  Influential, although not necessarily well 
understood, mathematical logicians, connected to information science through the gestalt 
of the computer, such as Gödel, were strongly and explicitly Platonist.  A further analogy 
with Platonism in information science could be found in bibliometrics, where products of 
intersubjective human activity, such as citations and publications, are treated as objective 
existents, capable of yielding measures of research impact necessarily more valid than 
those obtainable directly from the people who generated them.  Similarly, ideas in 
documents for indexing have been assumed to exist, and to be discoverable for labelling, 
apart from their, or any, language of expression.  Human activity in the making and 
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renewal of semiotic products is then obscured.  A counter movement can be discovered in 
the reference to artefacts of language, such as documents, by the name of their authors, 
even for later editions of books, affirming their human origins, with similar treatment of 
some scientific theories, although material technologies are still called by their generic 
name, removing evidence of humanity and human labour in their making.   
 
The recognition of analogies with Platonism does, crucially, open up the possibility of a 
related, although still differentiated, critique: that information technology, like 
mathematical axioms and theorems, is a radical human construction, but with patterns 
imposed on recalcitrant material substance as well as on semiotic phenomena. 
 
Summary 
 
In summary, then, information technology has been implicitly understood as objectively 
given, with an associated, but more explicit, conception of causality from technology to 
society.  Both modern and pre-modern information technologies are conceived as 
exogenous to logic and mathematics, particularly in their hardware or material aspects.  
Technology has also been conceptualized as an autonomous development, reproducing 
itself without human intervention, with a similar sense of causality from technology to 
society but a stronger connection with technological determinism, which could be 
ascribed to the idea of technology as acting and not just existing independently.  In both 
scholarly and public understandings, theories have been divided from their 
materialization, with a limited understanding of the dynamic of interaction between them.  
Mythically, technology was conceived as threatening and unnatural, with the threat to the 
human body replaced by a danger of supplanting the human mind.  A deep analogy with 
Platonism could be found in the view of technology and of mathematical axioms as 
objectively given rather than humanly created.  Understanding has, then, tended to remain 
arrested at the level of appearance, receiving technology as a ‘natural fruit of social 
labour’ rather than as a ‘historic product’ (Marx, 1993, p.700).   
 
Conclusion 
 
The implied attitudes to technology which have been revealed are pervasive, may not 
reach the level of formal articulation, and can appear weak when articulated.  The 
combination of pervasiveness with lack of formal articulation embodies classic features 
of repression: 
 
The mark of something repressed is precisely that in spite of its intensity it 
is unable to enter consciousness.  
 
(Freud, 1990, p.73) 
 
Repression occurs in collective rather than primarily individual minds, in an extension of 
concepts beyond the individual, legitimated by elements in Freud’s work, particularly 
through the idea of the community as also having a super-ego (Freud, 2002, p.77) and of 
surviving ‘myths [as the] … distorted vestiges of the wishful phantasises of whole 
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nations, the secular dreams of youthful humanity’ (Freud, 1990, p.140).  Revelation of 
attitudes through language, particularly through the animist elements inherited from the 
early stages of social development, strengthens the sense of repression, through the 
analogy between the savage and modern neurotic (Freud, 2001, pp.1-2). 
 
For individual neurosis, ‘analysis … brings simultaneous cure’ for the sufferer (Freud, 
1990, p.112), but cure may not follow recognition for collectively held attitudes.  A 
similar opening can be, and here has been, made by identifying the symptoms of 
repression and raising the repressed to consciousness, exposing its limitations and 
recognizing that the implied position is unsatisfying.  Articulating a more developed and 
intellectually satisfying counter-position may involve the difficult and painful effort at 
theory.  Relevant disciplinary perspectives on information technology, which both inherit, 
and, particularly in the social construction of technology (Stewart and Williams, 1998; 
Kling, Rosenbaum, and Hert, 1998; Bowker and Star, 2000; Bowker, 2005), begin to 
transform and depart from the elements of repression identified here, will need to be 
considered, with a full counter-position developed from critiques of Platonism which 
insist on logical and mathematical axioms as human constructions and from Marx’s 
conception of technology as ‘created by the human hand’. 
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Notes 
 
1  The title of this paper itself alludes to a classic, although neglected, locus for understanding technology as 
a human construction, a passage from Marx’s Grundrissse, concerned primarily and immediately with 
productive rather than information technology: 
 
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting 
mules etc.  These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into 
organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature.  They are 
organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, 
objectified.  The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social 
knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the 
conditions of the process of social life itself have come under control of the general 
intellect and been transformed in accordance with it.  To what degree the powers of social 
production have been produced, not only in the form of knowledge, but also as immediate 
organs of social practice, of the real life process. 
 
(Marx, 1993, p.706) 
 
The conception of technology as a radical human construction, given in the Grundrisse, underlies the more 
empirical treatment of industrial technology in the later Capital, but is not made as explicit there (Marx, 
1976, pp.492-639).   
 
2  Searches in August 2007 revealed 19 references to Rosenberg, 1974 in the ISI citation indexes with c.10 
substantive references to the ‘gestalt of the computer’ recalled by a Google search, with some commonality 
between the citing and the recalled documents (Thomson ISI, 2007; Google, 2007).  Patterns of citations 
over time indicate a slight recent revival. 
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3  The distinction of conceptualization, invention, innovation, and diffusion is derived from economics 
(Rosenberg, N., 1976, pp.192-93). 
 
4  Consider, for instance, Marx’s view of the effects of the diffusion of productive technologies on the 
relative advantage obtainable by adopters. 
 
As machinery comes into general use in a particular branch of production, the social 
value of the machine’s product sinks down to its individual value, and the following law 
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asserts itself: surplus-value does not arise from the labour-power that has been replaced 
by the machinery, but from the labour-power actually employed in working with the 
machinery. 
 
(Marx, 1976, p.530) 
 
5 Interestingly, Hyman (1982, p.242) warns that, great caution is needed in relating Babbage’s Engines to 
modern computers. 
 
6 Ordinary discourse may itself be elusive and difficult to produce as evidence, particularly in its spoken 
form, but judgments and legislative considerations in connection with copyright can be regarded as socially 
shared and endorsed texts and used as a surrogate.  A pattern of emphasizing the mechanical aspects of new 
information technologies, followed by assimilation to categories for existing semiotic products, can be 
discerned.  For instance, it was considered ‘strained and artificial’ to state that ‘a mechanical instrument 
which reproduces a tune copies it’ in an early 20th century United States Supreme Court judgment, under 
the existing legislation (White-Smith v. Apollo, 1908, pp.2984-2985), but closely subsequent legislation 
treated ‘the parts of musical instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work’ as 
constituting copies (Copyright Act, 1909, §25(e)).  By the later 20th century, only one member of a 
commission convened to review copyright in new technological uses of copyrighted works argued that 
copyright protection should not ‘extend to a computer program in the form in which its is capable of being 
used to control computer operations’, as, in this form, a program was ‘a machine-control element, a 
mechanical device’ (Contu, 1978, pp.1 and 27).  The progressive assimilation can be regarded as an aspect 
of naturalisation, specifically of relatively novel technological processes to products already partly 
conceived as natural, and to semiotic rather than mechanical products. 
 
7  ‘The demonstration of theorem 11, while not a pure existence proof, has some of the 
deficiencies of such proofs.  An attempt to obtain good approximation to ideal coding by 
following the method of the proof is generally impractical.  In face, apart from some rather trivial 
cases and certain limiting situations, no explicit description of a serious approximation to the ideal 
has been found.’  (Shannon, 1993a, p.39) 
 
